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Abstract 
 
This  paper  examines  if  a  firm’s  alliances  affect  the  persistence  of  its  financial  performance.  The  literature 
suggests two conflicting views concerning this effect. In particular, access to resources and innovation and the 
risk of imitation from alliances can have different impacts on performance. In our empirical analysis, based on a 
panel of 509 firms covering the years 1992 to 2002, return on assets was regressed on the number of alliances 
and other control variables using hierarchical linear modeling. Results support the positive view of alliances as 
mechanisms  to  sustain  competitive  advantage  and  escape  from  competitive  disadvantage  through  access  to 
external, valuable resources held by other firms. Alliances also help firms to constantly innovate and buffer 
themselves from external shocks that erode existing advantages. Our results, however, may be specific to the 
period and the institutional context under consideration and we do not distinguish between types, purposes and 
“strength” of alliances. We contribute to the debate about profit persistence by examining one particular factor 
that has been neglected in the literature: the extent to which firms engage in alliances with other actors. From a 
managerial perspective, our study shows that alliances can be used as an effective tool to support superior 
performance or avoid lock-in into inferior performance. 
 
Key words: alliances; persistence; sustainability; performance. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Starting  with  the  trailblazing  work  by  Mueller  (1986),  scholars  have  been  increasingly 
interested in factors that may induce persistence of firm-specific, abnormal profits—profits that are 
consistently above the average of a given industry for a certain period of time. Indeed, much of what is 
said in the discipline of strategy has to do with how firms sustain their competitive advantage in the 
long  run,  usually  measured  by  the  way  in  which  firms  consistently  outperform  competitors.  The 
resource-based view of the firm, for instance, emphasizes the role of valuable, rare and difficult-to-
imitate  resources  as  sources  of  sustained  advantage  (Barney,  1991).  The  profits  of  firms  whose 
production chains rely on generic and imitable resources may rapidly converge to the industry norm 
because competitors will be able to develop similar or substitute products and fiercely compete in the 
marketplace.  D’Aveni  (1994)  even  proposes  that  competitive  settings  are  becoming  increasingly 
hypercompetitive.  Strategic  maneuvering  by  firms  and  rapid  technological  change  create  an 
environment where it becomes more and more difficult to avoid the dissipation of profits, as evidenced 
in the research by Wiggins and Ruefli (2005). Recognition of the central role of persistence in the 
strategic management field has triggered a stream of research examining factors that may increase or 
decrease the ability of firms to sustain their competitive advantage over time (e.g. Jacobsen, 1988; 
McGahan & Porter, 1999; Roberts, 1999; Waring, 1996). 
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by examining one particular factor that has been 
neglected in that literature: the extent to which firms adopt a strategy to engage in alliances with other 
actors. As posited by Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996), alliances provide access to resources and 
competencies held by other firms including new distribution channels, complementary knowledge to 
jointly develop new products, shared production platforms, and so forth. However, most empirical 
research  has  assessed  how  alliances  create  competitive  advantage  (see,  for  example,  Anand  & 
Khanna, 2000 and Chan, Wensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997), instead of evaluating their effect on 
sustainable advantage. Scrutinizing this effect is particularly important not only because the use of 
alliances has apparently increased in recent years, as shown by Hagedoorn (2002) and Lavie (2007), 
but also because there are conflicting perspectives on how alliances might affect persistence. On the 
one hand, some scholars have observed that alliances might provide firms with access to external 
resources and competencies held by other firms, thereby allowing them to respond to shocks that 
would otherwise render their own resources obsolete and lock them out of external opportunities (Lee, 
2007;  Leonard-Barton,  1995;  Liebeskind,  Oliver,  Zucker,  &  Brewer,  1996).  Following  this  logic, 
alliances might increase the persistence of competitive advantage. On the other hand, widespread use 
of alliances may be negatively associated with an ability to protect and develop internal resources that 
could create sustainable advantages. Indeed, Hamel (1991) and Chesbrough and Teece (1996) have 
argued that alliances may become conduits of knowledge leakage, as partners (which are, in some 
cases,  actual  or  potential  competitors)  learn  from  practices,  client  bases,  and  even  technologies 
developed  by  the  firm.  Following  this  alternative  logic,  alliances  may  reduce  the  persistence  of 
advantage. Therefore,  judging  from  what is  posited  by received theory, the  effect  of alliances  on 
sustainable competitive advantage is, a priori, ambiguous. 
We begin by describing in detail the theoretical arguments that lead to the different predictions 
above. Given that previous studies have uncovered asymmetric persistence effects (Chacar & Vissa, 
2005; Jacobsen, 1988; Villalonga, 2004), we present arguments implying distinct effects of alliances 
depending on whether the firm is exhibiting competitive advantage (i.e., profits above the norm of 
their industry in a given period) or competitive disadvantage (profits below the norm). We then test 
those  competing  hypotheses  using  a  sample  of  firms  from  the  United  States  and  combining  two 
distinct datasets: financial data from COMPUSTAT and alliance data from Thomson’s SDC Platinum, 
which  tracks  the  formation  of  alliances  and  joint  ventures  based  on  publicly  available  sources. 
Following past studies, we assess persistence by directly examining the coefficient of past, lagged 
performance (in our case, return on assets) when current performance is used as a dependent variable. 
The  larger this coefficient, the  longer profits  will persist. We, however, innovate by  employing a 
hierarchical  structure  on  our  model;  that  is,  the  coefficient  of  persistence  itself  is  modeled  as  a S. G. Lazzarini, L. A. L. Brito, F. R. Chaddad     4 
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function of diverse variables, including the propensity of the firm to form alliances. After presenting 
and  discussing  our results, we  conclude by pointing out implications for theory and practice,  and 
suggesting an agenda for future research.  
 
 
Theory: Persistence of Profits and the Role of Alliances 
 
 
Persistence of profits 
 
The issue of how profits persist over time has long interested both economists and strategic 
management scholars. The competitive market paradigm implies that escalating entry, imitation or 
price-based  competition  will  promote  an  intra-industry  convergence  of  profits.  If,  however,  firms 
display an ability to sustain positive abnormal profits — defined here as profits that remain for a long 
time above the average of a given industry (Mueller, 1986; Waring, 1996) — then there will be a clear 
departure from perfect competition. As a matter of fact, the search for above-the-norm profits is at the 
core of much what is discussed in the strategic management field. Either through the development of 
specific market positions (Porter, 1985, 1996) or through the acquisition of valuable, rare and difficult-
to-imitate resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), the goal of the strategist is clearly to sustain profits 
—  or,  more  generally,  competitive  advantage:  “the  amount  to  which  an  industry  incumbent 
outperforms the average for its industry” (McGahan, 1999, p. 378).  
This fundamental issue has sparked a flurry of empirical research attempting to assess, based on 
actual  data,  whether  firms  display  persistent  profits  or  not,  and  what  are  the  determinants  of 
persistence. Building on Mueller’s (1977, 1986) pioneering work, empirical studies on persistence 
have adopted variants of the following regression: 
Rit = β0 + β1Rit-1 + eit,                      (1) 
where Rit is a measure of economic performance (usually, return on assets) of firm i at year t, Rit-1 is 
the firm’s lagged performance measure, and eit is an error term. The coefficient β1 is the so-called 
coefficient of persistence. The larger this coefficient, the more current performance will depend on 
past performance and, hence, the longer firms will be able to sustain their profits.  
In general, empirical research has found significantly positive persistence coefficients, which is 
consistent  with the  view that imperfect competition  allows firms to sustain profits for some time 
(Connolly & Schwartz, 1985; McGahan & Porter, 1999; Mueller, 1986). More recent research also 
evaluated how the ability of firms to sustain performance has changed over the years. Here we have 
mixed results: while some have empirically observed declining persistence rates (Thomas & D’Aveni, 
2009;  Wiggins  &  Ruefli,  2005),  which  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  industries  are  becoming 
increasingly  hypercompetitive,  others  have  found  no  such  effect  (McNamara,  Vaaler,  &  Devers, 
2003). Furthermore, there is flagrant variability in coefficients of persistence both across and within 
industries (e.g. Cubbin & Geroski, 1987; McGahan, 1999). In other words, some firms will arguably 
be able to sustain profits in the long run, while others — perhaps the majority (Wiggins & Ruefli, 
2002) — will not. A natural question then arises: what are the factors that allow firms to increase the 
persistence  of  their  profits?  Studies  have  uncovered  several  factors  which  significantly  affect 
persistence, including industry structure (Geroski & Jacquemin, 1988; Mueller, 1986; Waring, 1996), 
firm size or market share (Jacobsen, 1988; Mueller, 1986; Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002), degree of vertical 
integration  (Jacobsen,  1988),  innovative  propensity  (Roberts,  1999),  and  intangibility  of  assets 
(Villalonga, 2004), among others.  
We analyze in this study the effect of a firm-specific factor that, to our best knowledge, was not 
considered in previous studies: the extent to which the firm engages with alliances with other actors. 
As  we  discuss  below,  there  are  strong  theoretical  reasons  why  this  factor  may  be  an  important Conduits of Innovation or Imitation?  5 
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determinant of persistence, even though there is controversy regarding the nature of the effect (positive 
or negative).  
 
Alliances and profits 
 
Interorganizational  alliances  are  collaborative,  interdependent  efforts  between  two  or  more 
firms (see, for a general discussion, Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Gulati, 1998). They can have a 
variety  of forms and purposes,  including agreements to share  markets  or distribution  channels, to 
engage in joint R&D efforts, and to develop and commercialize new products. We do not distinguish 
here between alternative types or specific purposes of alliances; instead, we adopt a resource-based 
approach (Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Lavie, 2007) by considering that 
alliances involve, fundamentally, the use and articulation of other firms’ resources. More specifically, 
we  consider  that  alliances  are  “about  creating  the  most  value  out  of  one’s  existing  resources  by 
combining these with others’ resources, provided, of course, that this combination results in optimal 
returns” (Das & Teng, 2000, p. 37). For instance, a firm that decides to sign a sales agreement with 
another  firm  downstream  in  the  value  chain  will  attempt  to  benefit  from  tangible  (e.g.,  logistics 
infrastructure) and intangible resources (knowledge of local customers) to create a series of advantages 
such as increased market penetration, lower operational costs, etc. Similarly, firms engaged in an R&D 
alliance will combine their distinct knowledge sets to improve existing products or create new ones.  
Eventually, these strategic efforts will lead to competitive advantage and the firm will generate 
profits above the industry norm. The critical issue that we address in this paper is whether alliances 
lead,  or  don’t lead, to sustainable  competitive advantage,  defined as profits above the  norm that 
persist in the long run. Additionally, we also explore the effect of alliances on the sustainability of 
competitive disadvantage, when firm profits are below the norm. Arguably, a firm may benefit from 
the resources of other firms to escape from disadvantaged market positions and more quickly converge 
to  the  mean  of  its  industry.  If  this  effort  succeeds,  the  firm  might  begin  to  build  firm-specific 
advantages in the future. For this reason, in the following discussion and in our empirical tests we 
distinguish  between  the  effect  of  alliances  in  the  persistence  of  competitive  advantage  and 
disadvantage. Indeed, research has found that persistence effects tend to be asymmetric depending on 
whether firms exhibit performance above or below the norm (Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Jacobsen, 1988; 
Villalonga,  2004).  Within  this  perspective,  Table  1  summarizes  our  theoretical  arguments  and 
hypotheses, which are detailed below. 
 
Table 1 
 
Summary of Hypotheses 
 
    Effect of alliances on persistence 
    Increase  Decrease 
Persistence 
of… 
Competitive 
advantage 
(Hypothesis 1a) 
Alliances provide firms with access to 
external resources creating an ability 
to innovate and respond to new shocks 
that could erode an existing 
competitive advantage. 
(Hypothesis 1b) 
Alliances provide partners with access 
to a firm’s internal resources, thereby 
leading to imitation and erosion of 
existing advantages. 
Competitive 
disadvantage 
(Hypothesis 2b) 
Alliances crowd out the development 
of internal resources necessary to 
create competitive advantage. 
(Hypothesis 2a) 
Alliances provide firms with access to 
external resources creating an ability 
to respond to past shocks that induced 
competitive disadvantage. 
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The  positive  effect  of  alliances:  sustaining  competitive  advantage,  escaping  from 
competitive disadvantage 
 
The positive effect of alliances on competitive advantage—either by sustaining an advantage or 
reversing a disadvantage—fundamentally rests on the idea that alliances provide firms with external 
resources,  i.e.,  resources  held  by  other  firms  (Eisenhardt  &  Schoonhoven,  1996;  Lee,  2007). 
Consider, for instance, a firm that has developed a successful product in the past, but the product faces 
the risk of becoming obsolete due to an emerging technological innovation developed by a competitor. 
Through an R&D alliance with a partner holding complementary knowledge, the firm may be able to 
anticipate and respond to the external innovation that could render its own product obsolete (Leonard-
Barton, 1995; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Sampson, 2007). Also, the R&D alliance may allow the firm to 
tap into other firms’ knowledge and, consequently, modify existing products or processes and even 
develop new ones. Similarly, sale agreements allow firms to draw from other actors’ local resources 
and gain new market share. In sum, access to external resources allows firms to anticipate and respond 
to new shocks that would otherwise erode profits and even create competitive disadvantage (Zaheer & 
Bell, 2005). 
Therefore,  alliances  may  provide  firms  with  an  ability  to  dynamically  sustain  competitive 
advantage  precisely  because  improved  access  to  external  resources  will  allow  them  to  frequently 
introduce modifications to existing products or processes and, as a result, continuously create new 
demand or reduce costs (Roberts, 1999). Following Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997, p. 515), alliances 
may help create dynamic capabilities, i.e., the ability of “appropriately adapting, integrating, and 
reconfiguring  internal  and  external  organizational  skills,  resources  and  functional  competencies  to 
match  the  requirements  of  a  changing  environment”.  According  to  these  authors,  “increasingly, 
strategic advantage requires the integration of external activities and technologies” (p. 518) (see also 
Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). The development of dynamic capabilities should also involve a continuous 
learning  process  whereby  firms  refine  their  procedures  to  screen  valuable  partners  and  develop 
routines to manage interorganizational relationships (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; 
Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002) — resources that themselves tend to be firm-specific and  difficult to 
replicate. Dyer and  Hatch (2006)  find  evidence that interfirm  learning is relationship-specific and 
therefore difficult to transfer to other firms (see also Mesquita, Anand, & Brush, 2008).  
Similar logic leads to the conclusion that, through alliances, firms may be able to escape from 
an  existing  competitive  disadvantage.  Thus,  suppose  that  a  firm  is  facing  declining  sales  due  to 
diminishing  demand  in  its  established  markets.  Through  a  sales  or  marketing  agreement  with  a 
distributor, for instance, the firm may be able to reach new, growing markets. Similarly, a firm facing 
technology  obsolescence  may  pursue  licensing  agreements  with  firms  on  the  cutting  edge.  Even 
though  these  efforts  may  not  necessarily  create  competitive  advantage,  they  will  likely  induce 
convergence of performance from a negative situation (profits below the norm) to the mean of the 
industry  in  which  the  firm  is  located.  In  other  words,  alliances  will  reduce  the  persistence  of 
competitive disadvantage. 
We therefore conclude by presenting our first pair of hypotheses, predicting a positive effect of 
alliances on the temporal evolution of firm-specific performance: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. The higher a firm’s involvement in alliances with other firms, the higher the 
persistence of that firm’s competitive advantage. 
 
Hypothesis 2a. The higher a firm’s involvement in alliances with other firms, the lower the 
persistence of that firm’s competitive disadvantage. 
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The  negative  effect  of  alliances:  undermining  competitive  advantage,  sustaining 
competitive disadvantage 
 
While the positive effect of alliances is rooted in the benefits of accessing external resources, 
the negative effect stems from the idea that alliances will be negatively associated with an ability to 
protect  and  develop  core,  internal  resources.  Typically,  partnering  firms  “directly  or  indirectly, 
consciously or unconsciously, exchange information about their respective markets, pricing policies, 
production processes and the like. They expose each other to their way of operating” (Nakamura, 
Shaver, & Yeung, 1996, p. 522). Given that a great deal of learning and transfer of skills will likely 
occur  in  the  alliance  (Hamel,  1991;  Khanna,  Gulati,  &  Nohria,  1998), imitation  of  products  and 
processes for the private benefit of individual partners may be an intended or unintended outcome of 
the interfirm interaction — regardless of whether partnering firms are competitors or complementary 
actors in the value chain. If they are direct or potential competitors, the benefit of learning from one 
another and applying the acquired knowledge to their own activities will be a natural way to catch up 
and  even  outcompete industry peers (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). Alliances  may also be conduits of 
imitation  even  if  firms  are  not  direct  competitors.  Thus,  crafting  flexible  production  processes 
involving several partners for a broad range of activities in the value chain allows the firm to benefit 
from specialized actors but, at the same time, reduces the firm’s protection of core resources.  For 
instance, a firm relying on outside partners to provide key components of a given product will face the 
risk that, in the future, those partners will supply similar components to actual or potential competitors 
of that firm. Chesbrough and Teece (1996) cite the example of IBM, which committed to an open 
architecture of the PC computer system but at the same time relied on external partners (Microsoft, 
Intel) that themselves stimulated entry by new manufacturers. Therefore, the mere act of creating a 
competitive  advantage  through  alliances  may  mean  that  that  advantage  will  be  fundamentally 
temporary; alliances may thus reduce the persistence of profits above the norm.   
On the other hand, in the case of firms facing competitive disadvantage,  widespread use of 
alliances may substitute for internal resources that would otherwise create sustainable advantages. 
Thus,  Porter  (1990,  p.  3)  contends  that  “no  company  can  rely  on  another  outside,  independent 
company for skills and assets that are central to its competitive advantage. Alliances are best used as a 
selective tool, employed on a temporary basis or involving noncore activities”. Given that interfirm 
relations will require time and effort to sustain joint activities, extensive focus on external partnerships 
may crowd out efforts to develop valuable, firm-specific resources internally. Even worse, the very 
process of alliance formation implies that firms without valuable internal resources may run out of 
valuable partnering opportunities, as players within and across industries will fiercely attempt to find 
instead potential partners with cutting-edge technology and advantaged market positions. Eventually, 
firms  with  competitive  disadvantage  will  likely  face  what  Gomes-Casseres  (1994,  p.  72)  terms 
“strategic gridlock”: only a few, weaker partners will be available for a firm that is unable to attract 
more  valuable  partners  at  the  outset.  In  other  words,  alliances  will  be  associated  with  profits 
consistently below the norm.  
This discussion leads to a competing pair of hypotheses, now predicting a negative effect of 
alliances on the temporal evolution of firm-specific performance: 
Hypothesis 1b. The higher a firm’s involvement in alliances with other firms, the lower the 
persistence of that firm’s competitive advantage. 
Hypothesis 2b. The higher a firm’s involvement in alliances with other firms, the higher the 
persistence of that firm’s competitive disadvantage. 
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Data and Methods 
 
 
Data 
 
We test our hypotheses using a sample of firms from the United States and combining two 
distinct  datasets:  financial  data  from  COMPUSTAT  (research  database,  with  manufacturing  firms 
only) and alliance data from Thomson’s SDC Platinum (which, based on publicly available sources, 
records  alliances  formed  by  firms  throughout  the  world).  Following  Waring  (1996),  we  adopt  a 
particular  period  to  collect  data  on  factors  that  might  affect  persistence,  and  then  evaluate  the 
persistence of performance after that period. Namely, we observe the formation of alliances in the 
1988-1992 window, assign information on those formed alliances to a sample of COMPUSTAT firms, 
and  then  observe  persistence  of  performance  in  a  subsequent  temporal  window  (1992-2002). 
Following the bulk of research on persistence, and given our focus on the long-term persistence of 
short-term profits, we employ ROA (return on assets) as our measure of economic performance. Given 
the goal of the research, the use of market-based measures (such as price-to-book ratios or Tobin’s q) 
would not capture our desire to assess the persistence of period-to-period profits. As Roberts (1999, p. 
659)  put  it,  “it  is  not  desirable  to  have  current  and  future  returns  confounded  in  the  same  profit 
measure. As such, ROA (defined as the ratio of net income to total assets) is preferred as the measure 
of firm profitability”.  
The following criteria were used to restrict our sample of firms. First, given our focus on U.S. 
firms, we consider only alliances for which there was at least one partner with headquarters in the 
United States. Second, using information from the U.S. Census Bureau, we pre-selected 30 industries 
(based on 3-digit SIC codes) with the highest aggregate revenues, to which we added some extra 
industries exhibiting a large number of alliances formed in the 1988-1992 window, and from which we 
eliminated some industries in which no alliance was found in the SDC database. Third, we kept only 
firms for which complete financial data for the 1992-2002 period were available, and eliminated firms 
with extreme ROA figures (which we defined as inferior to -50% or superior to 50%). We ended up 
with 509 firms (5,520 observations), distributed across 22 industries. Overall, 18.8% of our firms were 
observed with at least one alliance formed in the 1988-1992 period. 
Also following past research (e.g. Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Mueller, 1977; Roberts, 1999), ROA 
was normalized by industry. That is, for each period (year) and for each industry, we subtracted a 
firm’s ROA for the  industry  mean in that particular period. This transformation provides a direct 
measure  of  profits  above  (or  below)  the  norm.  Focusing  on  the  three  years  preceding  the  profit 
observation window (i.e., 1990-1992), we computed the average normalized ROA for each firm and 
then  created  sub-samples  of  firms  to  explore  the  differential  effect  of  alliances  on  persistence 
depending on whether the firm  exhibited competitive advantage or disadvantage at the outset. For 
robustness, we employed two distinct procedures to create sub-samples. In the first procedure, we 
simply split the original dataset into firms that had a positive average normalized ROA (279 firms) and 
those that exhibited a negative average normalized ROA (230 firms). In the second procedure, we 
eliminated  firms  that  had  a  middle  ground  performance,  and  considered  that  firms  exhibited 
competitive advantage if they had an average normalized ROA 0.5 standard deviation above the mean 
of the entire dataset (137 firms). Similarly, firms with an average normalized ROA of -0.5 standard 
deviation or lower (98 firms) were considered as firms exhibiting competitive disadvantage. 
Our variable measuring the alliance activity of a given firm, Alliancesi, measures the number of 
alliances (joint ventures included) formed by each firm i within the 1988-1992 observation window. 
To be sure, the SDC Platinum database focuses on publicly announced alliances and therefore ignores 
alliances that were privately formed by firms. This is an important limitation of the database, which is 
explicitly recognized by previous authors who used it (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000). However, our 
measure can be understood as a proxy for the intensity of use of alliances by a particular firm. Firms 
more willing to adopt alliances should be more inclined to not only pursue, but also announce those 
deals. Thus, we believe that this measure captures, albeit imperfectly, the essence of the effect that we Conduits of Innovation or Imitation?  9 
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are  intent  on  measuring.  In  creating  this  variable,  we  did  not  distinguish  between  different  types 
(equity or non-equity) or purposes (marketing, production, R&D, etc.) of alliances. Following our 
theoretical discussion, we are basically interested in the extent to which firms are inclined to form 
alliances in general as a way to tap into external resources, either tangible or intangible.   
 
Methods 
 
The  literature  on  persistence  has  employed  different  techniques  to  model  firm  performance 
along the lines of equation (1). The initial studies (Cubbin & Geroski, 1987; Mueller, 1977; Waring, 
1996)  estimated  an  average  persistence  coefficient  for  different  groups  of  firms.  Waring  (1996), 
specifically, analyzed factors that could explain the variability of this persistence coefficient according 
to aggregate industry characteristics. McGahan and Porter (1999) decomposed returns into several 
components  (segment,  corporate  parent,  and  industry)  and  calculated  segment-  (or  firm-)  specific 
persistence. However, in their final analysis, they used weighed averages of these estimates. When 
examining  the  effects  of  variables  affecting  persistence,  researchers  have  usually  interacted  these 
variables with lagged returns (e.g. Jacobsen, 1988; Roberts, 1999; Villalonga, 2004). 
While  retaining  the  original  concept  involving  equation  (1),  we  adopt  in  this  paper  a 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) approach, which is well suited for the purposes of our study for 
several reasons. First, HLM accounts for the natural hierarchical structure of data. In our case, several 
observations  of  firm  returns  are  nested  within  specific  firms  which,  in  turn,  are  nested  within 
industries. HLM explicitly addresses the lack of independence across these levels. The method also 
allows us to use explanatory variables simultaneously at different levels of analysis (Hofmann, 1997; 
Misangyi,  Elms,  Greckhamer,  &  Lepine,  2006).  Second,  the  technique  allows  us  to  model  firm-
specific persistence coefficients, recognizing that firms are essentially different and that our objective 
is to explore and explain these differences in persistence. Third, HLM assumes that these firm-specific 
persistence coefficients are a realization of a probability distribution and provides estimates of the 
relevant parameters. Thus, the persistence coefficient is itself treated as a random variable, affected by 
variables such as the extent to which firms engage in alliances. Instead of employing interactions with 
the  lagged  dependent  variable,  the  HLM  method  allows  us  to  directly  model  the  determinants  of 
heterogeneous, firm-specific persistence coefficients. To compute our estimates, we used the HLM 
6.02 (Hierarchical Linear Model) software, which implements a maximum likelihood algorithm to fit 
HLM models. 
To  facilitate  comprehension,  we  employ  a  sequence  of  models  with  increasing  complexity 
(Singer & Willet, 2002). The simplest model (A), the so-called empty model, displays no explanatory 
variables and is just designed to demonstrate the hierarchical structure of the data. The equations for 
such a model, using the notation by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and Rit (the normalized ROA of firm 
i at year t) as the central performance variable, are: 
Rit = π0i + eit      Level 1 (firm performance observations)  (2) 
π0i = β00 + r0i      Level 2 (firm)  (3) 
β00 = γ000 + u00      Level 3 (industry)  (4) 
The terms π0, β00, and γ000 all have the same average (the average performance for all firms) but 
display different variance components associated with each level. The term u00 represents the effect of 
industry effects on performance, the term r0i captures firm-specific effects, and the term eit represents 
yearly performance effects for each firm. Given that we use a performance variable normalized by 
industry, the third level becomes irrelevant. We present these models with the third (industry) level for 
completeness, but omit it in the presentation and discussion of our empirical results 
The  second  model  (B)  introduces  the  lagged  performance  variable  and  the  firm-specific 
persistence coefficient in the first level. S. G. Lazzarini, L. A. L. Brito, F. R. Chaddad     10 
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Rit = π0i + π1iRit-1 + eit          Level 1  (5) 
π0i = β00 + r0i            Level 2   (6) 
π1i = β10 + r1i            Level 2   (7) 
β00 = γ000 + u00            Level 3  (8) 
β10 = γ100              Level 3  (9) 
This model introduces the term π1i, which is equivalent to the persistence coefficient presented 
in equation (1). This persistence coefficient, however, is now modeled differently for each firm, as can 
be seen in equation (7). The term β10 is the mean estimate for the persistence coefficient for all firms. 
In this model, we did not consider a variance component addressing the variability of the persistence 
across  industries.  Exploratory  tests  proved  it  to  be  very  small  relative  to  the  other  sources  of 
variability,  justifying  a  more  parsimonious  model.  The  introduction  of  the  persistence  coefficient 
should  alter  the  parameters  calculated  in  model  (A).  Thus,  one  could  expect  that  the  variance 
associated with the terms eit (in equation 5) and r0i (in equation 6) should be reduced compared to its 
equivalents in equations (2) and (3). This variance reduction can be taken as an additional explanatory 
power of the model (Singer & Willet, 2002). 
The  third  model  (C)  introduces  explanatory  variables  at  the  firm  level.  We  include  two 
variables. The first variable, Sizei, is used as a control and represents the logarithm of total revenues 
averaged  within  the  1992-2002  window.  The  second  variable,  Alliancesi,  is  our  key  explanatory 
variable: the extent to which firm i engages in alliances with other firms (as discussed before). The 
model thus becomes: 
Rit = π0i + π1iRit-1 + eit          Level 1  (10) 
π0i = β00 + β01Sizei + r0i          Level 2  (11) 
π1i = β10 + β11Sizei + β12Alliancesi + r1i      Level 2  (12) 
β00 = γ000 + u00            Level 3  (13) 
β01 = γ010              Level 3  (14) 
β10 = γ100              Level 3  (15) 
β11 = γ110              Level 3  (16) 
β12 = γ120              Level 3  (17) 
The coefficients  β11,  β12  now  represent  the  effect  of  size  and  number  of  alliances  on  the 
persistence coefficient. The term β01 is the effect of size on performance directly. Again, we kept the 
third level with no variance and no explanatory variables.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
Our results are presented in Table 2 below. The first column presents the results for the total 
sample,  while the  other four columns present the results for subsets of this sample using the two 
methods to determine competitive advantage and disadvantage. Columns 2 and 4 represents subsets 
where firms had superior performance in the reference period – an indication of competitive advantage 
– while columns 3 and 5 represent subsets of firms with inferior performance in the reference period – 
an indication of competitive disadvantage. Following the sequence of models described before, we Conduits of Innovation or Imitation?  11 
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begin by fitting Model (A) to our data, thus allowing for an examination of the baseline variance 
structure.  In  general  terms,  the  variance  associated  with  interfirm  differences  corresponds  to 
approximately a third of total variance, which is roughly in line with most variance decomposition 
studies (e.g. McGahan & Porter, 1997; Misangyi et al., 2006; Rumelt, 1991). In other words, this 
result corroborates the  view that firm-specific factors are the  major factor to  explain performance 
variability. Our data also indicate that groups of firms with competitive disadvantage present larger 
performance variance than groups of firms with competitive advantage, regardless of the way in which 
we split our sample. This result supports the view that competitive advantage and disadvantage can 
imply different performance dynamics and that analyses made for top performers may not necessarily 
hold for poor performers. The objective of fitting model (A) is, however, only meant to serve as a 
baseline to assess the other models.  
  
Table 2 
 
Results: Comparison of Models 
 
  Total 
sample 
(1) 
Split sample: normalized 
ROA above or below zero 
Split sample: normalized 
ROA 0.5 std. deviation 
above or below the mean 
Advantage 
(2) 
Disadvantage 
(3) 
Advantage 
(4) 
Disadvantage 
(5) 
Model A – Empty Model           
Number of firms  509  279  230  137  98 
Variance between firms (associated with r0i in eq (3))  0.00423  0.00252  0.00337  0.00251  0.00589 
Variance within firms (associated with eit in eq (2))  0.00812  0.00609  0.01065  0.00628  0.01718 
Total variance (sum of the above)  0.01235  0.00861  0.01399  0.00879  0.02307 
Model B – Persistence            
Persistence coefficient mean (β10)  0.41006  0.49067  0.30581  0.50696  0.32389 
Persistence coefficient variance  0.04657  0.03959  0.03434  0.04938  0.02801 
Variance between firms  0.00065  0.00016  0.00086  0.00008  0.00194 
Variance within firms  0.00731  0.00541  0.00965  0.00541  0.01515 
Explained variance between firms  84.63%  93.65%  74.48%  96.81%  67.06% 
Total explained variance  35.55%  35.31%  25.04%  37.54%  25.92% 
Model C – Explanatory variables           
Persistence coefficient mean (β10)  0.40317  0.47752  0.28119
  0.48381  0.30452 
Effect of Alliances on persistence (β12)  -0.00199  0.00581
  -0.00640***  0.01450***  -0.01599*** 
Effect of Size on persistence (β11)  0.02893**  0.02303  -0.04268*  -0.02963  -0.02332 
Effect of Size on base performance (β01)  0.01329***  0.00821***  0.00907***  0.00744***  0.02024** 
Persistence coefficient variance (residual)  0.04278  0.03878  0.03060  0.04589  0.02453 
Variance between firms  0.00058  0.00011  0.00087  0.00007  0.00189 
Variance within firms  0.00728  0.00541  0.00963  0.00540  0.01510 
Explained variance between firms   10.77%   31.25%   -1.16%   12.50%   2.58%  
Explained variance of the persistence coefficient  8.13%  2.06%  10.89%  7.08%  12.40% 
Note. *** p < 0.01
 **
 p < 0.05 * p < 0.10 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects) 
Model (B) introduces the persistence coefficient, which is allowed to vary by firm, assuming a 
different value for each firm during the analysis period. The model also estimates the variance of the 
persistence coefficient across firms. The first aspect to note is the mean of the coefficient. The overall S. G. Lazzarini, L. A. L. Brito, F. R. Chaddad     12 
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figure of 0.41 for the persistence coefficient of the entire sample is comparable to the 0.39 estimate 
found by Chacar and Vissa (2005) for a larger sample of U.S. firms in a roughly similar period. Our 
results also confirm the finding by those authors that superior performance exhibits higher persistence 
than  poor  performance.  The  sub-samples  with  firms  exhibiting  competitive  advantage  presented 
persistence  coefficients  close  to  0.5,  while  in  the  case  of  firms  with  competitive  disadvantage 
coefficients were close to 0.3. We have again another indication that top and poor performers have 
different profit dynamics. We also observe that the variability of the persistence coefficient is quite 
relevant. While the mean for the complete sample is 0.41, the estimated variance of 0.0457 (0.2138 
when expressed as a standard deviation) indicates a wide distribution of persistence values. The limits 
of two standard deviations above and below the  mean indicate that there  will be firms  with zero 
persistence alongside firms with persistence above 0.8. That is, this result suggests firms do  vary 
widely in their ability to sustain competitive advantage (or disadvantage). 
Model (B) significantly reduced the residual variance as compared to model (A). Most of the 
firm-level variance was explained, showing that the specification with lagged return as an explanatory 
variable  is  an  effective  model  to  represent  performance.  In  the  case  of  firms  with  competitive 
advantage, in particular, more than 90% of the firm-level variance was explained by the persistence 
modeling. 
Model (C) introduced the explanatory variables in order to test the proposed hypotheses. In this 
model,  Sizei  was  introduced  as  group  centered,  so  as  to  avoid  affecting  the  interpretation  of  the 
intercept (which then corresponds to the persistence of a firm  of average size in its industry). The 
Alliancesi variable, however, was used with no centering, so the intercept is now the persistence of a 
firm  with  zero  alliances.  The  negative  and  statistically  significant  effect  of  alliances  on  profit 
persistence shown in the subsets of firms presenting competitive disadvantage lend strong support for 
Hypothesis 2a: a larger number of alliances facilitates a firm in recovering from a previous situation of 
competitive disadvantage (p < 0.01). Probably the additional, external resources that alliances provide, 
even if generic and easy to imitate, can allow firms to catch up with rivals and thus move towards at 
least competitive parity, lowering their persistence values. The magnitude of the coefficient is also 
interesting.  For  the  sub-sample  of  firms  with  competitive  disadvantage,  defined  as  0.5  standard 
deviation  below  the  mean  in  terms  of  normalized  ROA  (column  5),  estimates  indicate  that  each 
additional alliance is expected to reduce the coefficient of persistence by -0.016.  
The  effect  of  alliances  of  firms  with  competitive  advantage  showed  less  clear  results.  Our 
estimates for the sub-sample of firms with normalized ROA 0.5 standard deviation above the mean (a 
more rigorous assessment of competitive advantage – column 4) lend support for Hypothesis 1a: each 
additional alliance is expected to increase the coefficient of persistence by 0.014 (p < 0.01). However, 
no  significant  effect  is  found  for  the  sub-sample  of  firms  where  competitive  advantage  is 
operationalized as a positive average  normalized ROA at the  outset. Apparently, alliances sustain 
performance  especially  in  the  case  of  firms  that  are  really  top  performers.  These  industry  top 
performers appear to be able to leverage their internal resources with alliances while mitigating the 
negative leakage effects from such alliance activity. Hypothesis 1b and 2b are rejected by our data: we 
do not have support for the view that alliances either reduce the persistence of superior performance 
(probably  by  facilitating  imitation)  or  increase  the  persistence  of  poor  performance  (probably  by 
crowding out the development of internal, valuable resources). 
Sizei proved to be a relevant, direct correlate with performance. Its coefficient was significantly 
positive in all samples, indicating that larger firms do enjoy benefits probably due to market power or 
economies of scale and scope. This result is very much in line with previous empirical studies of profit 
persistence. The effect of size on the persistence coefficient, however, is unclear. In three of the five 
samples it was not statistically significant and showed opposite results in the other two. It appears that 
size does have an effect on performance, but does not have such an influence on the sustainability of 
high (or low) performance. 
It is also worth noting that, although our variables do play a role in explaining the persistence 
coefficient, we are able to explain at most 12.4% of the variance of that coefficient (column 5). A great Conduits of Innovation or Imitation?  13 
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deal  of heterogeneity in the persistence  coefficients remains unexplained. This result indicates the 
need to address additional variables that could explain firm-specific persistence of performance in 
future studies. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on performance sustainability by examining a 
firm-specific factor that has been neglected in previous research: the extent to which the firm engages 
in strategic alliances. Surprisingly, although studies have attempted to examine whether firms create 
value through alliances (e.g. Anand & Khanna, 2000; Chan et al., 1997; Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 
1994), the literature has been silent about whether alliances allow firms to sustain value over time. 
Moreover, as we show in this paper, distinct theoretical arguments point to distinct effects of alliances 
on  sustainable  advantage.  Michael  Porter  summarizes  the  state  of  this  discussion  by  saying  that 
“there’s  little  evidence  that  I’m  aware  of  showing  that  extensive  partnering  and  alliances  are 
associated with superior performance. And I can think of lots of case studies where partnering has 
been directly associated with poor performance” (Argyres & McGahan, 2002, p. 48). 
Our results support the positive view of alliances for performance. Specifically, we find that 
engaging in a larger number of alliances both increases the persistence of superior performance and 
decreases the persistence  of inferior performance. Alliances can be beneficial for firms that enjoy 
competitive  advantage  and  superior  performance,  but  are  even  more  critical  to  firms  facing 
competitive disadvantage and subpar performance. For firms with competitive disadvantage, alliances 
can contribute through improved access to external, valuable resources held by other firms, allowing 
the  firm  to  leave  the  position  of  disadvantage  and  move  to  at  least  parity.  For  firms  with  clear 
competitive advantage alliances are also beneficial, probably providing mechanisms through which 
firms can constantly innovate and buffer themselves from external shocks that would otherwise erode 
existing advantages. 
From a managerial point of view, our study also shows that alliances can be used as an effective 
tool to either support superior performance or avoid entrapment into inferior performance. Therefore, 
at least judging from our results, the growing use of alliances in management practice is apparently 
warranted. 
To be sure, our study is associated with important limitations, which suggest potential avenues 
for  future  research.  First,  we  observe  alliances  in  a  narrow  temporal  window  and  examine  the 
persistence  of performance  in a relatively short period of time, at least compared to  other studies 
(Thomas  &  D’Aveni,  2009).  For  this  reason,  our  results  may  be  specific  to  the  period  under 
consideration. It would be interesting for future research to consider larger periods and even observe 
alliances in multiple periods of time. Second, given our focus on the effect of alliances in general, we 
do  not  distinguish  between  types  and  purposes  of  alliances.  Future  research  could  examine,  for 
instance, whether alliances between competitors or between firms with more complementary positions 
in the value chain have distinct effects on persistence. In the same vein, scholars could also attempt to 
examine  the  effects  of  national  versus  cross-border  and  vertical  versus  horizontal  alliances.  Also, 
future research could examine how the strength or intensity of the alliance could affect the degree to 
which firms are able to sustain profits. Thus, longer-term ties may induce the creation of relationship-
specific  knowledge,  which  will  typically  be  less  prone  to  interfirm  transfer  than  more  generic 
knowledge generated by shorter-term ties (Dyer & Hatch, 2006). Lastly, our focus on a single country 
prevents generalization to other institutional contexts. Chacar and Vissa (2005), for instance, show that 
persistence  differs  across  countries,  as  well  as  the  effect  of  organizational  choices  (in  their  case, 
affiliation to business groups). There are reasons to believe that the institutional context of countries 
will affect the value of forming alliances (e.g. Xin & Pearce, 1996). Similarly, distinct institutions 
(such as legal protection against technological leakage) should affect the degree to which firms are 
able to sustain advantages created through interorganizational connections. S. G. Lazzarini, L. A. L. Brito, F. R. Chaddad     14 
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